One of the important factors for economic development is the existence of an effective tax system. The paper, which is the second part of Le, Moreno-Dodson, and Rojchaichaninthorn (2008), deals with the concept and empirical estimation of countries' taxable capacity and tax effort to develop further country tax effort typologies. It employs a cross-country study from a sample of 110 developing and developed countries during 1994-2009. Taxable capacity refers to the predicted tax to gross domestic product ratio that can be estimated with the regression, taking into account a country's specific macroeconomic, demographic, and institutional features. Tax effort is defined as an index of the ratio between the share of the actual tax collection in gross domestic product and the predicted taxable capacity. The use of tax effort and actual tax collection benchmarks allows us to rank countries into four different groups: low tax collection, low tax effort; high tax collection, high tax effort; low tax collection, high tax effort; and high tax collection, low tax effort. This classification is based on the benchmark of the global average of tax collection and a tax effort index. The analysis provides guidance for tax reforms in countries with various levels of tax collection and tax effort.
I. INTRODUCTION
A wide development community is increasingly recognizing the centrality of effective taxation to development.
2 The G-20, multilateral institutions, and the donor community want to ensure that their assistance to developing countries to reinforce their tax systems is effective, coherent, and well harmonized (OECD, 2011) .
Higher tax revenues are also important to lower the aid dependency of low-income countries. Tax systems can influence international investment decisions. They also encourage good governance and they are integral to strengthening state building and promote state accountability.
Effective tax systems are not only significant for developing countries but also for developed ones. Given that budget deficits have been dramatically increasing in many countries following the introduction of large stimulus packages to promote economic growth with the financial and economic crisis of 2008, governments have been searching for possible ways of increasing tax revenues to finance public expenditures and narrow the deficit without much distorting economic activities.
The first step to understand public revenue systems is to establish some commonly agreed performance measurements and benchmarks. In this regard the paper deals with the concept and empirical estimation of countries' taxable capacity and tax effort. This paper is the second part of Le, Moreno-Dodson, and Rojchaichaninthorn (2008) and intends to develop further country tax effort typologies in order to fulfill emerging needs from developing countries' policy makers.
Measuring taxation performance of countries is both theoretically and practically challenging. The actual tax to GDP collection ratio is generally interpreted as a measure of tax effort and used as the basis for cross country tax comparison. The use of such ratio is reasonable if one attempts to establish trends or to compare tax revenue performance across countries with similar economic structure and at the same level of income. However, when used to compare the effectiveness in revenue mobilization across countries in different income groups, the tax-GDP ratio could provide a "completely distorted" picture due to different economic structures, institutional arrangements, and demographic trends. A number of tax economists have attempted to deal with this problem by applying an empirical approach to estimate the determinants of tax collection and identify the impact of such variables on each country's taxable capacity. The development of a tax effort index, relating the actual tax revenues of a country to its estimated taxable capacity, provides us with a tempting measure which considers country specific fiscal, demographic, and institutional characteristics.
This paper employs a cross-country study to estimate tax capacity from a sample of 110 developing and developed countries during 1994-2009 and the two sub-periods of 1994-2001 and 2002-09 . In this study, we extend the empirical methodology applied by Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) , and Bird, Vazquez, and Torgler (2004) . The estimation results are used as benchmarks to compare taxable capacity and tax effort in different countries. Taxable capacity refers to the predicted tax gross domestic product ratio that can be estimated with the regression, taking into account a country's specific macroeconomic, demographic, and institutional features. Tax effort is defined as an index of the ratio between the share of the actual tax collection in gross domestic product and the predicted taxable capacity. The concepts of taxable capacity and tax effort are also extended to measure total fiscal revenue capacity and revenue effort.
Calculating tax effort and actual tax collection benchmarks allows us to rank countries into four different groups: (i) low tax collection, low tax effort; (ii) high tax collection, high tax effort; (iii) low tax collection, high tax effort; and (iv) high tax collection, low tax effort. This classification is based on the global average of tax collection and a tax effort index of 1, corresponding to the case when tax collection is exactly the same as the estimated taxable capacity.
The analysis provides guidance for countries with various levels of tax collection and tax effort. The authors argue that while taxation is always a critical dimension of fiscal policy for all countries, countries at various stages of development and with different initial levels of tax collection and effort should rely on different strategies for tax reforms. Our analysis focuses on tax performance and provides broad directions for reforms in developing countries.
Section II provides an overview of the worldwide trend in tax revenue collection across incomegroups and geographic regions, using the tax-to-GDP ratio as a measure of tax collection. Section III highlights alternative measures of the tax performance of countries and extends the existing literature to the empirical estimation of a country's taxable capacity and tax effort. This section also investigates the trends in taxable capacity and tax effort across regions. Based on the level of tax collection and the tax effort index, countries are classified into different groups. This section also compares the new results with the ones reported in Le, Moreno-Dodson, and Rojchaichaninthorn (2008) , which was covering a shorter time period. Some policy implications for fiscal revenue reforms follow. Section IV concludes.
II. TRENDS IN TAXATION

Data
The simplest definition of tax effort, which is commonly used in the literature, is the share of tax revenue in percentage of GDP. It does not give detailed information on tax collection relative to taxable capacity, but still it provides us with a simple measure to see the trends across countries, income groups, as well as regions. The highest tax share belongs to the high-income group. They collect almost 2-3 times higher taxes in percentage of GDP when compared to the low-income group and almost 10 percentage points higher taxes when compared to the middle-income group. Tax collection in this group further increased by 1 percentage point between 2003 and 2009, a rise from 28.4% to 29.3%.
After initial drops in tax collection rates mainly due to the global financial and economic crisis of 2008, the increasing trend in tax collection is expected to continue given that public spending and budget deficit increased enormously in recent years.
Geographical Regions and Taxation
Another factor determining tax rates is the geographic region of countries. Figure 2 presents the share of tax revenues in percentage of GDP across regions. 7 The lowest tax rate belongs to the South Asia region (SAR); they collect 10.5 to 11.2% taxes as a share of GDP. 8 The East Asia 7 The countries in each region are listed in Table A2 in Annex. 8 It should be noted that one reason for why we observe such a low tax ratio in SAR is that these numbers are for central government only and the tax collection in SAR may be more decentralized than in any other regions. and Pacific (EAP) region has the second lowest tax collection rate in the world. Taxes in EAP are around 4 percentage points higher than the one observed for SAR. The tax share in the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region, the Sub-Saharan Africa (AFR) region, and the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) present similar tax collection, which is around 18% of GDP. But the shares have been consistently rising in the LAC and MENA regions in recent years.
Figure 2 -Tax Revenue (as % of GDP) by Regions, 1994-2009
Source: The World Bank classification and WDI. 
Definitions of Taxable Capacity and Tax Effort
Actual tax revenue as a share of GDP is one of the most commonly used measure of tax effort for cross country tax comparison. The biggest advantages of this measure are that it is easy to obtain and gives quick overview of tax trends across countries. But, as indicated in and endorsed by Musgrave (1987) and Le, Moreno-Dodson, and Rojchaichaninthorn (2008) , this measure is more suitable for studies focusing on similar economic structures and at the same level of income. Such trends in the tax-to-GDP ratio across income groups and regions are discussed in Section II.
The taxable capacity and/or the tax effort of countries can be more accurately measured if different country characteristics are taken into account. 11 For example, the income level of a country can be an important factor determining the tax-to-GDP ratio, as investigated in Section II. Higher-income countries can collect more taxes, while governments in low-income countries have only a limited ability in doing so. Similarly, different economic structures, institutional arrangements, and demographic trends can introduce differences in the taxable capacity of governments (Prest, 1979) . Overall, it is not accurate to determine the taxable capacity of countries only by checking their actual tax collection.
In the literature the taxable capacity and the tax effort of countries have been estimated using regression analysis, focusing on possible determinants of taxes. 12 As defined by Le, MorenoDodson, and Rojchaichaninthorn (2008) , Taxable capacity is the predicted tax-to-GDP ratio calculated using the estimated coefficients of a regression specification, taking into account the country specific characteristics. Tax effort is the index of the ratio between the share of the actual collection to GDP and the predicted taxable capacity. A "high tax effort" is the case when a tax effort index is above 1, implying that the country well utilizes its tax base to increase tax revenues . A "low tax effort" is the case when a tax effort index is below 1, 9 Only OECD countries included in this group are the ones not included in other groups; these are mainly highincome countries. 10 Changes in EU countries' fiscal revenues are studied by Morris et al., (2009) . They determine possible factors affecting taxes in the region. The listed factors are mostly not macroeconomic variables. 11 Improvements in revenue forecasting is important for governments to better evaluate fiscal balances and financing needs, especially during business cycles. In this regard, it is important to evaluate the response of revenue to output gap. Sancak, Velloso, and Xing (2010) find that as the output gap improves, the efficiency of taxes improves as well, where tax efficiency is defined as (tax revenue/tax base)/standard tax rate. 12 See Lotz and Mross, 1967; Bahl, 1971; Chelliah et al. 1975; Tait et al., 1979 , Tanzi, 1987 Bird et al., 2004; Le, Moreno-Dodson, and Rojchaichaninthorn (2008) .
indicating that the country may have relatively substantial scope or potential to raise tax revenues.
13
In addition to taxes, total fiscal revenue can be also analyzed in a similar way. As was the case in Le, Moreno-Dodson, and Rojchaichaninthorn (2008) , the same estimation techniques are used to calculate the capacity of countries in total fiscal revenue (tax plus non-tax collection) generation, which is named as fiscal revenue capacity, and their effort in revenue generation, named as fiscal revenue effort.
In this section, the estimation results are reproduced using the regression specifications of Le, Moreno-Dodson, and Rojchaichaninthorn (2008) . The main difference is that the new dataset covers a longer time period (instead of 1994-2003, it is now 1994-2009 ) and more countries. We also focus on sub-periods to understand how the tax effort of countries has changed overtime.
The first sub-sample is 1994-2001 and the second one is 2002-09.
Empirical Specification, Variables, and Methodology
The study includes 110 developing and developed countries and focuses on the period from 1994 to 2009, as well as two sub-samples 1994-2001 and 2002-09 . The empirical specifications used in the paper consist of possible determinants of tax revenue and total fiscal revenue as a share of GDP:
TAX/GDP is total tax revenue in percentage of GDP;
13 It should be noted that cross-country tax effort calculations presented in the paper cannot substitute for a comprehensive study of taxation, focusing on a particular country. There are potential problems related to this methodology such as the sensitivity of the calculation of the tax-effort index to the predicted results of a country's taxable capacity; systematic errors in measurement of independent variables; regression specifications can calculate the tax collection performance of a country in comparison with the average effort exercised by an average country in the selected sample, and this average may not be the actual tax collection performance. Given these potential problems, the results should be used to assess the feasibility of raising additional revenues, given the tax mix policy and collection effort attained at the average level, rather not the measure of actual performance (Ahmad, et al., 1986; Chelliah et al. (1975) ; Le, Moreno-Dodson, and Rojchaichaninthorn, 2008) . 14 See Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) , Bird, Vazquez, and Torgler (2004) The income level of a country is expected to be one of the significant factors determining actual tax collection. 16 As presented in Section II, higher-income countries tend to collect more taxes in percentage of GDP. Thus, it is expected that GDP per capita to have a positive and significant impact on tax collection, as well as on fiscal revenue (Bahl, 1971; Fox et. al, 2005; Piancastelli, 2001 ).
Higher age dependency and higher population growth are expected to distort tax collection capacity of countries and lower the share of productive population (Bird et al., 2004) . Thus, these two variables are expected to have a negative impact on taxes and total fiscal revenue.
Trade openness is one of the variables commonly considered as an important determinant of taxation (Rodrik, 1998; Piancastelli, 2001; Norregaard and Khan, 2007; Aizenman and JinJarak, 2009) . The changing size of international trade has expected to have two opposite effects on taxes. On the one hand, higher trade openness is expected to lower taxes collected on imports and exports; thus, it may have a negative impact on taxes and fiscal revenue. On the other hand, given that higher trade openness is associated with higher economic growth rates, we expect open economies to grow faster; and as a result, more taxes can be collected with increasing this tax base. It is expected that the second effect dominates and trade openness has a positive impact on taxes and total fiscal revenue. Given that it is relatively harder to tax the agricultural sector, it is expected that as the share of agriculture value added in percentage of GDP increases, collected taxes in % of GDP drop due to a smaller tax base (Leuthold, 1991; Tanzi, 1992; Piancastelli, 2001) . Thus, the expected sign of the agriculture value added ratio is negative.
Institutional and governance quality is considered as one of the most essential factors determining the adequacy of tax collection (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997; Ghura, 1998; Bird, et al., 2004; Gupta, 2007) . Countries can collect higher taxes only if the tax collection process is efficient. In this regard, bureaucracy quality index and corruption index, which are two possible measures of institutional and governance quality, are expected to have a significant impact on tax collection. The International Country Risk Guide reports several indicators of institutional and governance quality. In the original database, bureaucracy quality index and corruption index are reported as index numbers from 1 to 6. While "1" indicates the lowest bureaucracy quality or highest corruption, "6" corresponds to the highest bureaucracy quality or lowest corruption. Similar to the case in Le, Moreno-Dodson, and Rojchaichaninthorn (2008), we re-index both of these measures in this paper, such that lower numbers indicate a higher bureaucracy quality or lower corruption. Rescaling consists of defining a new range where -10 (least corrupt or best bureaucratic quality) and -1 (most corrupt or worst bureaucratic quality). With this new definition, we expect tax revenues to drop with increasing index values, meaning negative estimated coefficients of these variables.
A simple correlation matrix among these variables indicates the expected signs (see Table A3 in Annex). Tax revenue positively correlated with GDP per capita, and trade openness; and negatively correlated with age dependency ratio, population growth, agriculture value added, as well bureaucracy quality index and corruption index as defined in the paper. When we compare these results with the correlation values reported in Le, Moreno-Dodson, and Rojchaichaninthorn (2008) , which covered a shorter time period, it can be seen that the correlation between tax revenues and all other variables drops; it is especially true for GDP per capita. The only exceptions are bureaucracy quality index and corruption index; their correlation with tax revenues and total fiscal revenue gets higher.
Average values of the variables for each country are reported in Table A4 in Annex, while overall averages and other descriptive statistics of the variables are reported in Table A5 in Annex. When we compare the descriptive statistics reported in Le, Moreno-Dodson, and Rojchaichaninthorn (2008) with the new results obtained with an extended dataset from 1994 to 2009, it can be seen that tax revenues increased by 1.5 percentage points on average; total fiscal revenue increase by 1 percentage point; trade openness increase by 4 percentage points; population grows 0.4 percentage point higher; agriculture values added gets lower by 3 percentage points; and both bureaucracy quality index and corruption index improve by 1 index point. The total number of observations for tax revenue increases from 982 to 1,437, corresponding to almost 50% improvement.
The regression methodology is an ordinary least square for panel datasets. We include both regional and time dummies. One potential problem in using this methodology would be the possible endogeneity and/or dual causality problem associated with institutional variables (bureaucracy index and corruption index in this paper) and tax revenues. Higher taxes improve governance and improved governance can further increase taxes. Bird et al (2006) , who use a similar specification, test the presence of an endogeneity problem by applying a 2-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) approach and calculating Hausman Chi-square test statistics. 18 They include ethnic fractionalization, language, and latitude as instrumental variables. They show that the Hausman Chi-square tests fail to detect any simultaneity of tax revenues and institutional variables.
Tax Capacity: Estimation Results
The estimation results for the specifications given in Equations (1) and (2) are presented in Tables 1 and 2 for tax revenues and total fiscal revenues, respectively. The tax capacity of countries is defined as the fitted values calculated using the estimated coefficients reported in As reported in Table 1 , the estimated coefficients have the expected signs and they are mostly statistically significant. The exception is that in some regression specifications, where institutional variables are included, GDP per capita loses its statistical significance, and even it signs become unexpectedly negative. It can be interpreted as follows: when institutional variables are included together with income, the institutional quality variables can already capture the impact of income. The age dependency ratio has the correct sign, but its estimated coefficients are not significant for the sub period of 1994-2001. (2008), it becomes only 1.11 in the traditional tax specification; and it gets even lower and insignificant (0.503 and 0.002 with bureaucracy index and corruption index, respectively) when institutional variables are included in the specifications. It means that with the recent improvements in taxation in developing countries and on-going effort by high income countries to rationalize their tax systems toward greater efficiency and lower tax burden, particularly in direct income taxes, the income level becomes less important now in determining their tax revenues. On the other hand, the institutional quality of countries is more important (even more than income levels) in determining tax revenues of countries. The higher significance and magnitude of the estimated coefficients of the institutional variables in the new results support this argument. For example, while the estimated coefficient of the corruption index was only -0.560 in Table 1 of Le, Moreno-Dodson, and Rojchaichaninthorn (2008), it is now -1.273 and more statistically significant. This observation is also true for the bureaucracy quality index.
Another difference between the old and new estimation results is that the population growth rate has almost 2/3 lower estimated coefficients now, indicating a lower impact of population growth on tax collection. Table 2 presents similar results: all estimation results are as expected except GDP per capita and population growth rates in some specifications. When we compare these new results with the ones reported in Table 2 of Le, Moreno-Dodson, and Rojchaichaninthorn (2008) , it can be seen again that GDP per capita is less significant and has lower estimated coefficients now. It is also true for the population growth rate. On the other hand, the institutional quality indicators have higher estimated coefficients, as well as higher statistical significance.
In general, the results support the previous papers' findings, determining the factors affecting of tax and fiscal revenues. 19 Countries with higher income levels, a lower population growth rate, more trade openness, lower agriculture value added in GDP, and higher institutional quality tend to collect higher tax revenues and fiscal revenues as a whole. 
Robustness Check
For the robustness check of the empirical results, we also run alternative specifications.
The size of shadow economy can be another important variable determining the tax base of countries. The shadow economy measure used in this paper includes all market-based legal production of goods and services that are deliberately concealed from public authorities for any of the following reasons: (1) to avoid payment of income, value added or other taxes, (2) to avoid payment of social security contributions, (3) to avoid having to meet certain legal labor market standards, such as minimum wages, maximum working hours, safety standards, etc., and (4) to avoid complying with certain administrative procedures, such as completing statistical questionnaires or other administrative forms (see Schneider, Buehn, Montenegro, 2010) .
As the size of shadow economy increases, governments may not be able to collect taxes efficiently due to the fact that it gets harder to track profit, income, sales etc. Thus, it is expected to have a negative impact on tax collection (Bird, et al., 2004; Davoodi and Grigorian, 2007) .
The estimation results are reported in Table 3 Panel A. Since the data for the size of shadow economy are limited, the total number of observations drops to 840 from 1322. But the signs and significance of coefficients are robust to the inclusion of this new variable. The size of the shadow economy is a statistically significant and negative determinant of taxes. The main exception is the case where the bureaucracy quality index is included in the regression specification. In this case, the significance of the size of the shadow economy on taxes disappears. This may indicate that the bureaucracy quality index can already well capture the impacts of shadow economy. As the bureaucracy quality drops, it gets harder to monitor the economy efficiently; thus, the size of the shadow economy tends to increase.
Total consumption is also included as an alternative factor determining tax revenues. Higher consumption in percentage of GDP has a positive effect on tax collection. Higher consumption improves tax revenues mainly through higher indirect taxes (Bird, 2008) . Thus, the sign is as expected and the other results are robust to the inclusion of this new variable.
Overall, the results are robust to the alternative empirical specifications. 
Tax Effort: Estimation Results
The predicted value of tax collection is the estimated value of tax revenues, calculated using the estimated coefficients given in the second column of Panel A in Table 1 . The specification takes tax revenues as a function of GDP per capita, population growth, trade openness, agriculture value added (in percentage of GDP), corruption index, as well as regional and time dummies. Each dot in the figure indicates the position of a country, corresponding to their average tax revenues versus predicted tax revenues. The 45 degree line represents countries with the unitary tax effort. Along this line, tax collection exactly equals the predicted tax capacity. The predicted tax revenues are positively correlated with the actual collection, meaning that higher collection tends to be associated with higher tax effort. 20 The countries taking place above the 45 o line are the ones with a high tax effort (actual taxes are higher than predicted taxes). In terms of tax collection, given the values of their macroeconomic and demographic indicators, they seem doing well. On the other hand, the countries located below 45 o line are the ones collecting taxes below their tax capacity (low effort) and they have a room to improve their tax collection effort.
20 Similar findings are reported in Chelliah et al. (1975) and Stosky and WoldeMariam (1997) .
Figure 3 -Actual Tax Collection and Taxable Capacity, averages over 1994-2009
Note: Predicted tax/GDP is the taxable capacity in % of GDP, calculated based on the estimation results given in the second column of the results in Table 1 Panel A. Actual TAX/GDP is actual tax revenue in % of GDP.
The ranking of countries is reported in Table 4 . According to this ranking Papua New Guinea has the highest tax effort (1.66), while Bahrain has the lowest (only 0.16). Most developed countries are located around the value of 1 as tax effort index. In the sub-Saharan Africa region, Namibia (1.54) and South Africa (1.44) have the highest tax effort indexes. In the MENA region, Morocco has the highest tax effort score (1.44). In Europe, Malta and Cyprus have the highest scores at 1.40 each. While Vietnam (1.31) has the highest index in East Asia, France (1.29) and Brazil (1.26) also take place in the top 20 list. China has one of the lowest tax effort scores with the value equal to only 0.48. Japan and Switzerland are other countries with a low tax effort index with the values of 0.47 and 0.56, successively.
The average values give us the general picture of tax efforts across countries, but a detailed analysis of countries across regions and overtime can give a better idea on the trends in taxes. Figure 4 present this information across 7 regions.
After 1998, actual taxes in sub-Saharan Africa increased almost continuously, even if the predicted value of taxes is not increasing that dramatically. Since actual taxes have been increasing faster than predicted taxes, the tax effort of the region has improved significantly. 21 It increased from 0.85 in 1998 to almost 1.2 in 2006, indicating the countries on average were collecting almost 20 percent higher actual taxes relative to predicted taxes given the indicators 21 This fact has been also emphasized in and Gupta (2007) . Note: See Table A7 in annex for details. Tax effort is the ratio of actual tax revenues in percentage of GDP to predicted tax revenues in percentage of GDP (taxable capacity).
used in the estimation. It is not surprising that this period corresponds to higher growth rates in sub-Saharan Africa. In the region, actual taxes have been always above the predicted values of tax revenues.
In East Asia, the tax effort reaches to 1.15 in 2001 (indicating that actual taxes higher than predicted taxes); but it declines quickly after this pick point in 2001 and stays below 1 after 2003. Given that actual taxes are below predicted values, countries in this region are expected to spend more effort to increase tax revenues.
In Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the gap between actual and predicted taxes was big, in favor of predicted values, between 1996 and 2001. Following this period, predicted taxes declined with declining economic activities in the region; thus the tax effort index increased. At the same time, Latin American countries show a clearly rising trend in the tax effort after 1998, except the recent years. The tax effort index rose from 0.85 to 1.2 in 2008, at which point the region reached to the pick point. This increasing tax effort is as a result of increasing actual taxes. Throughout the years the ratio of actual taxes to GDP increased by almost 5 percentage points from 15 percent to 20 percent. The more stable economic environment is one of the main factors behind these increasing tax revenues (Fricke and Sussmuth, 2011) .
Similar to the case of Latin America, the Middle Eastern and North Africa region presents a clearly increasing trend in the tax effort from1999 to 2007. The index increased from 0.95 to 1.15 thanks to increasing actual taxes from 17% of GDP in 1999 to 22% on average in 2007.
South Asia has the lowest actual and predicted taxes in the world. The rates are even lower than the ones that are observed in sub-Saharan Africa, which is the poorest region in the world. After hitting the bottom in 2002 with actual taxes only 10.3% of GDP, both actual and predicted taxes increased significantly. Since the magnitude of increasing predicted taxes dominates the magnitude of increasing actual taxes, the tax effort index declined throughout the years from 1.2 in 1994 to 0.8 in 2009. The countries in this region are expected to do more to improve the level of tax collection.
When we focus on OECD countries (high-income countries included), the tax effort is almost flat at the value of 1 in the years following the initial increase. It means that for this group of countries actual and predicted taxes are very similar. Since tax revenues fluctuate only slightly from year to year in these countries, it gives a big advantage to their governments in terms of raising consistent revenues to finance expenditures.
When we focus on recent years, the trend in taxes and the tax effort is clear; it is declining each year. Due to financial and economic crisis of 2008, economic activities declined significantly in almost each country. The expected effect of this change on tax revenues is negative. Thus, it can be said that one reason for the declining trend of taxes is lower economic activities. At the same time, many governments introduced stimulus packages which include measures lowering taxes to promote the economy. This put additional pressure on tax collection. 
1994-2009
Note: TAX_GDPSSC is actual tax collection in % of GDP; predicted tax is the taxable capacity calculated based on the estimation results given in the second column of the results in Table 1 Panel A. Tax effort is the ratio of actual tax to taxable capacity. Regions are defined in Figure 2 .
Country Classification Based on Tax Collection and Tax Effort
Countries are classified into different groups, based on their tax efforts and actual tax collection. The value of one is used as the benchmark for the tax effort and 18.31 % (median of the tax-to-GDP ratio in the sample) for actual tax revenues. A country is regarded as a low-collection country if its actual collection is lower than 18.31 percent, and regarded as a high-collection country if its collection is above this level. Based on these definitions, the countries are ranked into four different categories: (i) low tax collection, low tax effort; (ii) high tax collection, high tax effort; (iii) low tax collection, high tax effort; and (iv) high tax collection, low tax effort. Table 5 gives the list of the countries in each group. Given that actual and predicted taxes are positively correlated as indicated in Figure 3 , the tax effort is positively linked to the actual tax collection as well. Thus, most countries take place in the low tax collection and low tax effort or high tax collection and high tax effort groups.
When we compare the country classification reported in 
Group 1: Low Collection and Low Effort
This group includes the highest number of countries from all geographic region; they are mostly low-income countries. The exceptions are Canada, Japan, Korea, and United States. Given low levels of actual tax collections, most Asian countries, not surprisingly, take place in this group.
When we compare the findings of Le, Moreno-Dodson, and Rojchaichaninthorn (2008) and the ones reported in Table 5 , it can be seen that Canada is a new developed country in the low-effort, low-collection group. It was initially in low effort, but high collection group. In the developing country group, Egypt, Ethiopia, Senegal, and Uganda are new members. In the original table, Egypt was in high effort and high collection group. All other remaining new countries were in the high effort but low collection group.
Given the importance of effective taxes in development, an improvement in the tax collection requires that the developing countries in this group to undertake comprehensive reforms of both tax policy and tax administration. 
Group 2: High Collection and High Effort
Mainly, middle-and high-income countries are included in this group. When we compare the findings of the previous paper with the ones reported in Table 5 , it can be seen that Australia appears as a (new) developed country in the high-effort, high-collection group. Initially, this country was collecting high taxes, but its tax effort index was low. Now both collection and effort are high for Australia. When we check the developing countries, Botswana, Chile, Trinidad and Tobago, and Vietnam are also new countries in the group. Both Botswana and Chile were originally in the low-effort, low-collection group, but they made it to the high-effort, high-collection group after recent improvements. Trinidad and Tobago was initially collecting tax revenues, but the tax effort was low, while Vietnam was in high effort, but low tax collection group.
Given that tax rates are already high in these countries, further increases in tax revenue collection may cause high economic distortions. But it does not mean that there is no room for improvement. Some countries face tax deficiencies; for example, Brazil. Some countries need to find a way of lowering the overall tax burden. As suggested by Le, Moreno-Dodson, and Rojchaichaninthorn (2008), tax reforms can aim to raise the efficiency of tax collection, including reducing tax-induced distortions and improving the business climate through further rationalizing the tax regimes, rebalancing the tax mix, and simplifying administration procedures.
Group 3: Low Collection and High Effort
All countries in this group are either low-income or lower-middle income countries. There is no single developed country reported in this group. The number of countries in this group is also the lowest when compared to other groups. Nicaragua and Sri Lanka are the two new countries in this group. Both of these countries were in low-effort and low-tax-collection group. With recent improvements they moved to high effort, but still low-collection group.
Given that in the lower-income countries, the tax regime and tax administration are not as efficient, the tax collection rates are low for this group. On the other hand, they deploy high tax efforts through enforcing easy taxes and/or imposing high taxes on the formal sector, as suggested by Le, Moreno-Dodson, and Rojchaichaninthorn (2008). Some short-term tax reform measures may include "streamlining tax policy and tax administration procedures to reduce compliance costs and encourage formality, and to lower tax barriers to firms' entry and operations". Similarly medium-to long-term reforms may cover "expanding the scope for raising revenue by broadening the effective tax base and enhancing the functioning of the tax administration".
Group 4: High Collection, Low Effort
Almost all countries in this group come from the upper-middle income group (11 countries) or high-income group (9 countries). Most developing countries in the group are located in ECA. These countries collect high taxes relative to the world average, but given their macroeconomic and demographic features, their tax effort remains low.
The new developing countries in the group are Bulgaria, Jordan, and Russia, while the new developed countries are Czech Republic, Denmark, Spain, and Sweden. When we compare the findings of Le, Moreno-Dodson, and Rojchaichaninthorn (2008) and the ones reported in Table  5 , it can be seen that all new countries come from the high-effort, high-collection group. It means that in all these new countries tax efforts have worsened.
Given that these countries are already collecting high tax ratios, they may need to restructure their tax mix from production to consumption sources. These countries mostly impose high factor income taxes, especially on labor (see Rutkowski, et al., 2005) . This can be shifted towards consumption, in order not to discourage economic activity and employment.
IV-Conclusion
Measuring taxation performance of countries is both theoretically and practically challenging. The development of a tax effort index, relating the actual tax revenues of a country to its estimated taxable capacity, provides us with a tempting measure which considers country specific fiscal, demographic, and institutional characteristics. It should be noted that the results in this paper need to be interpreted with care due to potential caveats in the modeling of tax capacity and effort, as well as in the measurement of the actual tax-GDP ratio. This study can be complimentary to but not substitute detailed analysis of a country's tax system, which can consider the country's overall fiscal policy taking in to account public expenditures needs and the overall level of development. It is recognized that making fundamental changes in a tax structure is a challenge due to possible public resistance and political weakness. The design of tax revenue reforms must be country specific and constructed after comprehensive analysis of the country's taxable capacity, revenue performance, and its top leadership political commitment.
As presented in the empirical analysis, several variables are important in determining the level of taxes in a country, but in recent years both the significance and the magnitude of the impact of institutional quality indexes on tax collection have increased strongly. This finding indicates that countries with better institutional quality such as bureaucracy quality or corruption can collect higher taxes. Countries need to consider improving the quality of governance if they want to increase the level of tax revenues.
Taxation is considered the best reliable way to finance public expenditures in the long run. Despite this fact, many developing countries experience a chronic gap between the actual and desirable levels of tax revenues. Taxation reforms are needed to close this gap, but such reforms cannot be the same for different countries. Taxable capacity and tax efforts present significant deviations across countries, income groups and regions, as well as overtime. But overall, developing countries seem to have more limitations to expand the scope for taxation, efficiently and equitably, which is determined by their taxable capacity. On the one hand, countries with a low level of actual tax collection and low tax effort may have more room to increase tax revenues to reach their taxable capacity without causing major economic distortions or costs. Finally, low-income countries with a low level of tax collection but high tax effort have less opportunity to increase tax revenues without creating distortions or high compliance costs.
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